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Behavior in the US in an Open Economy:
NAFTA and Beyond
Michael L. Nieswiadomy', Baldev Raj'
and DanieiJ SlottjeA
I. Abstract
There is considerable debate about how NAFTA will impact the U.S. labor market over
time. This paper presents both informal and formal statistical analysis of the nature of the
trend in work stoppage variables in the U.S. as a prelude to assessing the impact of NAFTA
(and beyond) on this important measure of the functioning of the labor market. We present
empirical evidence in support of the view that aggregate variables such as work stoppages
and the number of workers involved in them in the U.S. can be adequately described as a
segmented trend stationary process rather than as a difference stationary process. This evi-
dence not only has important implications for assessing the impact of NAFTA but also for
making the series stationary by removing the trend from the work stoppage variable. The
structural break in the trend as estimated from the data endogenously appears to be consis-
tent with an important large shock or event corresponding to the enactment of important
legislation in 1962 giving Federal Employees the right to bargain collectively. The analysis in
this paper is performed using a newly developed test of the hypothesis that the variable
under scrutiny has a unit root against the alternative hypothesis of trend stationarity with a
structural break at an endogenously determined point of time. To anticipate one of the con-
clusions of this paper, it is found that the two work stoppage variables cannot be adequately
described either as a linear trend stationary or difference stationary process since both fail
to account for the observed nonlinear trend pattern in them. Once the nonlinearity is taken
into consideration, then the work stoppage variables can be parsimoniously modeled as a
segmented trend stationary process as argued in the paper. This in turn lends support to the
interpretation offered in this paper of the potential impact of NAFTA and beyond on the
labor market behavior in the U.S. as characterized by work stoppages. Since the early 1980s
the downward trend in work stoppages has continued unabated. Little of the cyclical varia-
tion of past decades has been apparent recently. The increased openness of the U.S. econo-
my may be partly the cause. We speculate that the downward trend in work stoppages will
continue, as the effects of NAFTA continue to unfold.
1. Michael L. Nieswiadomy is a Professor of Economics at the University of North Texas, Denton,
Texas.
2. Baldev Raj is Professor of Economics at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada.
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11 Introduction
On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became
effective. NAFTA creates a free trade area of 370 million consumers and over $6.5 trillion of
annual output, linking the United States with our first largest trading partner (Canada) and
our third largest trading partner (Mexico). As a result of NAFTA, existing duties either were
eliminated or will be phased out in 5 or 10 years (for certain sensitive items, up to 15 years).
Many industrial goods are now tariff-free including computers, medical equipment, agri-
cultural equipment, internal combustion engines, and telephone switches, which once faced
tariffs of 10 percent or more in Mexican markets. Approximately 65 percent of U.S. indus-
trial and agricultural exports to Mexico will be eligible for duty-free treatment within 5
years (Economic Report of the President 1994).
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the growing strength of trade between the U.S. and Canada
and Mexico since 1982. (Table 2 shows the relation of U.S. trade with all of its trading part-
ners.) Mexican trade has grown steadily since its debt crisis of 1982, and particularly so
since it joined GATT in 1986 and lowered its trade barriers. Canada's trade with the U.S. has
also grown steadily, particularly since the free trade agreement went into effect in 1989,
although the 1990-91 recession delayed the impact. It is clear that the U.S., Canada, and
Mexico economies were becoming more integrated throughout the 1980s. The recent peso
devaluation will cause some short-term hardships for Mexico, but the long run integration
should continue. NAFTA will, of course, further propel this integration.
While there have been many questions concerning the various impacts of NAFTA on
domestic interests in the U.S., the effect on U.S. workers has perhaps drawn the most atten-
tion. NAFTA may well change the cost of striking for unionized workers in the U.S. This
paper will focus on modelling the historical strike behavior of U.S. workers. Since many
readers may not be familiar with time series statistical methods, a technical appendix is pro-
vided to help clarify concepts. Those readers unfamiliar with these concepts may want to
review the appendix now. These statistical exercises are performed in order to speculate
about what the impact of NAFTA may or may not be on future work stoppages in the U.S.
Unfortunately, due to the paucity of reliable international aggregate data, we adopt a uni-
variate approach as our modelling framework A comprehensive causal model of NAFTqs
impact on U.S. work stoppages would entail access to long historical time series of work
stoppage variables for Canada and Mexico. Since most of these data series only go back to
the early 1980's (or slightly earlier) we lack the data to construct a causal model. However,
the relatively long time series available for U.S. work stoppage behavior does allow us to
adopt a univariate statistical model to see what structural change (if any) has taken place in
the behavior of aggregate U.S. work stoppages over time. After examining the trend behav-
ior of the strike variables, we can then hypothesize how the fundamental institutional
changes embodied in NAFTA may impact U.S. work stoppages in the future.
II. Models of Work Stoppages
Sir John Hicks (1963), was the first to suggest that strikes occur by mistake; he also sug-
gested that a union's resistance to accepting a lower wage falls over time. Kennan (1980) and
Reder and Neumann (1980) reiterated this point by noting that even if strikes are mistakes
they should occur less frequently and for a shorter duration of time the higher total cost of
18 NAFT& Law and Business Review of the Americas
the strike to the union and firm. Others have argued that strikes are a consequence of
imperfect information on the workers' part as to the firm's ability to pay higher wages. The
assumption of asymmetric information is an integral part of the political strike model of
the type constructed by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). Such models postulate that there
are actually three parties involved in labor negotiations: the firm's management, the union
leaders, and the rank and file. The union leaders and the firm's management possess com-
plete information about the bargaining process, and so the union leaders know the maxi-
mum wage the firm's management will agree to. The union rank and file are not privy to
this information and may have unrealistically high expectations about the wage the firm is
willing to concede. As the strike time lengthens, wage expectations of the union rank and
file are revised downward and the minimum acceptable wage increase is consistent with a
negatively sloped "concession curve.' Nevertheless the union leaders may choose to strike to
avoid the politically damaging consequences of accepting a wage increase much lower than
was initially anticipated by the union members. The firm maximizes expected profit by tak-
ing the union's concession curve as given; the equilibrium wage increase and strike length is
obtained at the point along the "concession curve" at which there is a tangency with an iso-
profit curve or at a corner solution with no strike. The Ashenfelter-Johnson type political
strike model is usually criticized because it fails to explain why the wage expectations of the
union rank and file decline as the strike progresses (cf. Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991).
Recently, a new class of models have been developed that provide an alternative expla-
nation for why strikes occur during labor negotiations. The important contribution of these
models is that they recognize that a strike can be used as a "screening device" when there is
asymmetric information held by the negotiating parties. These models provide a story con-
sistent with the downward-sloping "concession curve" of both Hicks, and Ashenfelter and
Johnson.
Tracy (1987) and Hirtle (1985) have used private information models where they
attempt to proxy the unobservable component of the union "rent seeking" activity using the
residual from a CAPM securities-pricing equation. Tracy found some evidence in a sample of
contracts covering the years 1973 to 1977 that the probability of a strike is positively correlat-
ed with the variance of this residual. Hirtle, on the other hand, used a sample covering a
longer period of time, (1957 to 1980) and found little evidence to support this relationship.
The above mentioned models are all micro-oriented attempts to explain union-
employer relationships and attendant work stoppage behavior. They do not address the fact
that private sector unions have declined (see Table 3) and that aggregate work stoppage
behavior has changed. There has been less research done on analyzing work stoppage
behavior at the macro-level. Ehrenberg and Smith (1991) present many well known argu-
ments about why private sector unions have declined; these arguments raise a number of
competing hypotheses regarding statistical properties of a given aggregate work stoppage
variable. For example: Is it simply the case that aggregate work stoppage has declined signif-
icantly over time because union influence has waned? Is the decline uniform or does it
involve a one-time structural break due to one important event in the history of unions'
rights to bargain collectively? Is the time series behavior of aggregate work stoppage charac-
terizable as a -random walk with drift? One aim of this paper is to assess whether or not
aggregate work stoppage is integrated of order one like most macroeconomic variables in
the U.S. as shown by Nelson and Plosser (1982). If the work stoppage behavior is integrated,
there are at least two reasons this should be known to macro model builders of the labor
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market. First, it is an indication that factors such as "public sentiments" and general "eco-
nomic environment" may be spuriously related to work stoppages in the sense of Granger
and Newbold (1974) and Phillips (1986) unless they are co-integrated with the work stop-
pages variable (cf. Granger, 1981; Engle and Granger, 1987; and Johansen, 1991). Secondly,
macro analysis aimed at explaining work stoppages needs to be modelled carefully using co-
integration methodology since the macroeconomic analysis with integrated variables
involves both pitfalls and opportunities, as argued by Campbell and Perron (1991).
IV Data and Preliminary Analysis
The data used in this study are from the Department of Labor, Major Work Stoppages:
1993. The work stoppage variable is defined to include both lock outs by employers and
strikes for work stoppages involving over a thousand workers. One of the variables we have
examined is work stoppages. Its annual evolution from 1947 to 1993 is shown in Table 4
and is plotted in Figure 2. The other variable we look at is the number of workers involved
in work stoppages per annum, shown in Table 4. In Figure 3 we provide the time plot of this
variable. The time plots in Figures 2 and 3 (ignoring the solid lines for the time being whose
determination will be explained later on in the paper along with the estimation of the break
point) appear to be consistent with the view, excepting a few aberrations, that there is a uni-
form decline in aggregate work stoppages over time; moreover, there is an observed cyclical
pattern around the downward trend. These cyclical deviations or "normal shocks" around
the trend resulting from infrequent work stoppages are a consequence of the normal func-
tioning of the labor markets in the economy; these shocks do not contribute to "any perma-
nent" effect on the levels of the variables in Figures 2 and 3. This interpretation of the time
evolution of the work stoppage data is consistent with most conventional macro models of
the labor market, whose objective is to explain the cyclical movement of the union's behav-
ior. If we were to accept this explanation of time evolution of the data, there is little support
for the alternative hypothesis that there is a "Hysteresis Effect" with respect to union behav-
ior in the U.S. over time.
The sample autocorrelations (not shown) do not appear to be consistent with the
explanation of a downward deterministic trend in union activity. For instance, the sample
autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations estimates of the work stoppages variables (not
shown here) identify a ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) (0,1,1) model
for each of two variables. In summary, autocorrelation patterns of the variables are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the two aggregate work stoppage variables we analyze are inte-
grated of order 1. This informal evidence might appear less startling when one considers
related evidence (both formal and informal) given in Nelson and Plosser (1982) for thirteen
macroeconomic variables in the U.S. in support of the hypothesis of a unit root; by apply-
ing the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test they showed that the null of a unit root can
not be rejected by the data. Subsequent research has generally confirmed their results for
data from a number of other countries as well, although there is some controversy with
respect to the existence of a unit root in the data when one allows for a structural break in
the "linear trend" function as the alternative hypothesis. For example, Perron (1989, 1990)
and Zivot and Andrews (1992) have provided evidence that does not support the null of a
unit root for some macroeconomic variables in the U.S., when the structural break point is
permitted in the linear trend function, which is either exogenously or endogenously deter-
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mined. Raj (1992), who applied their framework, found that the null of a unit root in the
output of some industrialized countries can be rejected.
A formal test of alternative plausible interpretations for the work stoppage variables
will be performed in Section III using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Kwaitowski,
Phillips, Schmidt, Shin (1992, hereafter, KPSS) methodologies. The null hypothesis to be
tested is that each of the two work stoppage variables described has a random walk with
drift. The alternative hypothesis is that the variable has a linear downward deterministic
trend. In the terminology of Nelson and Plosser (1982), we are testing for the null hypothe-
sis of the "stochastic trend" or difference stationarity against the alternative of the "deter-
ministic trend" or trend stationarity in the two work stoppage variables.
The testing of the null of stationarity (linear trend) against the alternative of a unit root
is also performed following the recent best practice framework for determining the nature
of nonstationarity in the data since the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the unit root test
are known to have low power against a number of relevant alternatives for economic vari-
ables. Accordingly, the failure to reject the null of a unit root by the augmented Dickey-
Fuller, along with failure to reject the null of stationarity, might be interpreted as a misspec-
ification of the deterministic component of the time series process for work stoppages, fol-
lowing the suggestion in KPSS. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that work
stoppages have experienced an episodic shock, which may have caused a structural break in
its trend. The possibility that the work stoppage variables over time are integrated of order 1
would suggest that at an aggregate level, union behavior may involve long-term rigidities; as
a consequence, strikes and other "shocks" to work stoppage variables are likely to leave a
"permanent" effect on the level of the series. In summary, there may be a Hysteresis Effect in
work stoppage variables.
A more careful examination of the time plots in Figures 2 and 3 may suggest that the
specification of the alternative hypothesis of a linear deterministic trend for the downward
movement of the work stoppage variables is an over-simplification of the observed patterns.
In reality, the time plots in Figures 2 and 3 appear to have a non-linear pattern around the
mid 60's. This non-linearity can make the results of the ADF test suspect; specifically, it may
yield results that are biased towards the null hypothesis if the data actually has a non-linear-
ity or structural break or that the trend is segmented (cf. Rappoport and Reichlin, 1989;
Perron, 1989, 1990; Zivot and Andrews, 1992; Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock, 1992; and
Raj, 1992).
In Figures 2 and 3, we have plotted the fitted value (estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS)) of the work stoppage variables as a solid line from the model:
(2.1) st=ai +bt+ (a2 - a,) DUt+et (t= 1,2, ... , T)
where DU t = 1 for t > TB and 0 otherwise, ;.h TB = 1964, and et is the usual error term in
the regression. The solid line describes a linear trend with a level shift at 1964 (in Figures 2
and 3 is based on a procedure to be described in Section III of the paper which treats the
break point as an unknown parameter to be estimated in the statistical model of the data
generation process) which can be interpreted as a parsimonious characterization of nonlin-
earity in the trend function with a shift in its level (cf. Perron, 1989). This formulation can
be thought of as a convenient alternative to the framework in Hamilton (1989), whose
model of the time evolution of a variable is formulated as the sum of a non-linear trend
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component and an ARIMA component with a unit root. Furthermore, the deterministic
trend function is allowed to switch between high and low values according to a first-order
Markov Process. In this paper, Hamilton's framework will not be used.
The upward surge in the level of work stoppages in the mid 1960's could be the conse-
quence of the enactment of Executive Order No. 10988 in 1962 by President John F.
Kennedy which allowed Federal Employees to bargain collectively. The downward trend in
work stoppages thereafter could be attributed to a number of events such as the rising trend
in woman's labor force participation since it is well known that women don't join unions at
the rates that men do. There was also a general decline in union power resulting from the
relocation of industry from the East and Mid-West to the anti-union South, a systematic
decline in manufacturing activity with white collar workers replacing blue collar workers,
and the large expansion of the service sector. The service sector consists of many firms with
small numbers of employees so organizing costs are very high.
The arguments in favor of a possible shift in the level of the trend function provide
motivation for another test of the null hypothesis of a unit root with drift against the alter-
native of a linear deterministic trend with a shift in level of the series at an endogenous
break point, TB. This test will be performed by applying a test procedure developed by Zivot
and Andrews (1992); some closely related test procedures are available from Banerjee et al.
(1992) and Perron (1990). These papers also give critical values for the asymptotic distribu-
tion of the test statistics proposed by them.
V Empirical Results
Given the motivation for testing the alternative hypothesis outlined in the previous sec-
tion, we begin our analysis by presenting an alternative parametric formulation of the null
and alternative hypotheses and testing framework. Thereafter we present the empirical
results along with some discussion of the results.
The null hypothesis is that the work stoppage variable measured by either the number
of work stoppages or the number of workers involved in strikes is a random walk with drift.
Following Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1982), and Said and Dickey (1984), this null can be
parametrically formulated as:
(3.1) H0 : st=a+st, I+e t  (t= 1,2, ... , T)
where s, is the tth observation on the work stoppage variable, et is the error term in the
model such that A(L) et = B(L) vt with v J i.i.d.(o, (T2); and A(L) and B(L) are pth and qth
degree polynomials in the lagged operator L. In other words st is a difference stationary
process comprised of two components: an integrated component and a stationary ARMA
component.
This null hypothesis will be tested against two plausible alternatives: the first alternative
hypothesis is that the work stoppage variable is a linear trend stationary process. This null
can be parametrically stated as:
HI: St = a + b t + et(3.2) (t = 1,2, ..... T)
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The second alternative hypothesis is that the work stoppage variable consists of a linear
trend with one level shift at an unknown point in time TB, 1 < TB < T. Following Perron
(1989, 1990) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) this alternative hypothesis can be parametrical-
ly formulated as:
(3.3) Hj*: St = a2 + b t + (a2 - a,) DUt + et (t= 1,2,..., T)
where the parameter (a2 -al) represents the magnitude of the level shift of the variable such
that DU t = l if t > TB and 0 otherwise.
The ADF test procedure (cf. Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981; Said and Dickey, 1984)
which tests for H0 against H, amounts to testing for a parametric restriction that p = 1 in
the following augmented linear regression model.
k
(3.4) st= a + Pt + Ps . Vj At-j +V t
It is known that the asymptotic distribution of to follows a non-standard Dickey-Fuller dis-
tribution 4 instead of the usual tpdistribution, and the critical value of the asymptotic distri-
bution of to is available in a number of places including MacKinnon (1991) who provides
more accurate critical values for this test statistic. The application of this test requires an
appropriate choice of lagged parameters k corresponding to lagged differenced variables A
st_- in the model (3.4); the role of these regressors in model (3.4) is to soak up the extra cor-
relation in the noise process, et. In this paper we adopt the recommendation in Perron
(1989) in choosing the lag length k based on the t-test criterion where starting from some
suitable kma, and successively deletes A st-1's that are found to be insignificant. This method
has been shown to have a good size property for the unit root test.
However the conventional emphasis on testing whether the largest autoregressive root in
a time series equals 1 (that is the test of a unit root using the ADF test) fails to convey the
substantial sampling variability associated with this measure of persistence. Thus we test for
stationarity two ways. First, we set up the null hypothesis for nonstationarity, i.e., that a unit
root exists. Following recent trends in the testing for persistence in the literature, we comput-
ed the 90% asymptotic confidence intervals for p as based on T statistic in the Dickey-Fuller
regression; the choice of lag length is k=3, and the intervals are computed as in Stock (1991).
These confidence intervals are given in Table 5, while they are wide, do include p = 1 for the
two measures of work disruptions. Thus, the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alter-
native of trend stationarity cannot be rejected by either the number of work stoppages, or the
number of workers affected by the Dickey-Fuller test or the confidence intervals.
Second, we use the null hypothesis of stationarity. The evidence against the unit root is
presented in Table 6 based on the rij test statistic. With k>4 in both series, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of stationarity in favor of unit root since Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt,
and Shin (1992) (KPSS) recommend use of a longer lag length. Following KPSS we inter-
pret this evidence against the unit root as an indication of misspecification.
An important potential source of misspecification is that the coefficients of the trend
function that are determined by long-term fundamentals, such as the structure of the eco-
4. This is a standard ADF t. test for the null of a unit root against the trend-stationary alternative.
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nomic organization (i.e., the right to collectively bargain), has experienced a structural
change. In the context of aggregate work stoppage activity, the fundamentals experienced a
one time structural change in the 1960s.
It may be tempting to associate an alteration in particular legislation as the dominant
source of this fundamental change. However, we avoid this temptation since the choice of a
given specific event, if it is misspecified, may bias the test statistics in favor of a unit root.
Moreover, in order to allow for the appropriate degree of sampling uncertainty associated
with the choice of a particular year, we follow the development in the literature on unit root
and treat the year of break as an unknown parameter to be estimated from the model. A few
comments on the formulation of the alternative are in order.
After inspecting the data, and taking into account of chronology of events in this histo-
ry, we selected the innovation outlier model for the aggregate time series on work disrup-
tions. Moreover, we opted for the linear trend with a shift in its level at an unknown point
in time. This choice is motivated by two considerations. First, the temporal effect of the
large shock in the form of legislation change through deregulation is far from instanta-
neous, and more likely to have evolved over time. Second, the choice of nonlinear trend
with shift in its level, as opposed to shift in both level and slope in the unconstrained model,
may lead to tests with lower power compared to a constrained simpler model. In other
words, we are opting for a specification with as few constrained variables as possible. Since
there is not stronger a priori evidence for a change in the slope of the trend function, this
strategy appears reasonably objective.
The test of H0 against the alternative hypothesis H1* is carried out using a framework
in Zivot and Andrews (1992) (hereafter ZA). The ZA test utilizes the sequential testing pro-
cedure for the parametric restriction p* = 1 in the following augmented linear regression
model:
k
(3.5) st = a* + P*t + 5*DU t ( -) + P Ys_ +_ vj* Ast-j + vt (t = 1, 2, ..T)
where DU, ( ) = 1 if t > T.with i= TB/T, and 0 otherwise; the "hat" on the I signifies that it
corresponds to an estimated value of the structural break point in the data. That is, , is
chosen to minimize the one-sided t-statistic for the null p*=1. The critical values from the
asymptotic distribution of t are given in Zivot and Andrews (1992).
The results from the nested model (3.5) are given in Table 3, where minimum 'rt-statis-
tics are reported. We found the choice of k=3 to be appropriate for both variables respec-
tively. These **-statistics correspond to the minimizing value of t for p* = 1 from the
model (3.5). This minimum corresponds to the following 'rt-statistics
(3.6) to (.f) = inf t (X)XeA
where X is a specified closed subset of (.15n, .85n) where n is number of observations in the
sample.
Summary results for the test of H0 against H * are given in Table 7. The estimated year
of the break reported in Table 7 is found to be 1965 for both work stoppage and for the
numbers of workers involved variables.
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The results in Table 7 suggest that the null H0 is not supported by the data at a signifi-
cance level of 5% for the number of workers affected or at 10% for the number of work
stoppages when the alternative is H1* with"level shift" in the linear deterministic trend. The
asymptotic critical value for the test statistics for the minimum t (4 are taken from Zivot
and Andrews (1992). These conclusions are consistent with results in Sayers (1986) who
found some support for deterministic chaos in American work stoppage data.
VI. Interpretation and Implications for NAFTA's Impact
The results presented above suggest that both the aggregate work stoppage variable and
workers involved in them in the United States are integrated of order one provided the
alternative is linear trend stationarity; the evidence in support of integratedness of these
variables is no longer supported by the data as soon as the possibility of a structural break
with one time shift in its level is taken into account. The break appears to correspond to an
important episode in the labor legislation in the U.S., that is, the enactment of the Executive
Order of the President of the United States in 1962 which gave Federal workers the right to
bargain collectively. This legislation appears to have shifted the level of the two variables
during 1965 (endogenously determined). This level shift - a form of non-linearity -
when parsimoniously modelled into the alternative hypothesis of a linear trend with a shift
in level leads to the disappearance of the support for the null of a unit root for the work
stoppage variable, at a 10% significance level and for the numbers of workers involved vari-
able at a 5% significance level, when finite sample critical values are used. This means that
labor theorists modelling labor market behavior using the work stoppage and number of
workers involved variables, must account for these stylized facts in their model. Similarly
care must be taken in econometric analysis such that only an appropriate framework for
analysis consistent with these stylized facts is selected.
The trends in strike behavior in the U.S. are quite apparent from a casual empiric per-
spective. A rigorous statistical examination has validated our a priori beliefs. The trend has
been towards fewer and fewer strikes involving large numbers of workers. The NAFTA
agreement will most likely have the following impacts:
Point 1: Unions prefer industries/occupations with low elasticities of demand for out-
put so the demand for union workers will be inelastic.
Consequence 1: NAFTA will open markets so the demand for output in unionized
industries/occupations will be more elastic and demand for labor will be more elastic.
Point 2: When the demand for labor is elastic, a wage increase causes a relatively large
decrease in the quantity demanded of labor.
Consequence 2: Point 1 implies that when unions attempt to raise wages/total com-
pensation, because of NAFTA, unemployment losses will be greater and unions will experi-
ence more difficulty achieving their objectives.
Point 3: The more substitutes that are available for domestic labor, the more elastic the
demand for labor.
Consequence 3: NAFTA will certainly increase the elasticity of substitution between
U.S. workers and NAFTA workers. The consequence will again be more elastic demand for
U.S. workers. This makes strikes more difficult
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Point 4: A firm's ability to "fight" against a strike (or a unions ability to impose costs on
a firm by striking) depends on the competitive position of the firm. The more profitable the
firm, the more able the firm is (ceteris paribus) to wait out a striking labor force.
Consequence 4: NAFTA should make markets more competitive and diminish eco-
nomic profits above "normal" rates of return for most U.S. firms over time. This will dimin-
ish some U.S. firm's ability to impose long lockouts or waiting time on the striking workers.
Point 5: U.S. industry has recently adopted cost conscious strategies like "just in time"
production.
Consequence 5: NAFTA will put even greater competitive pressures on U.S. firms so
that inventories will be even leaner and lead time on production even lower. Thus, the firm
becomes even more vulnerable to the spectra of a strike since a given firm can't stockpile
output or inputs to "wait out" a striking labor force.
Point 6: When the demand for a unionized firm's product increases, the demand for
unionized labor increases. At a given point in time, if output demand increases, a firm can
lose customers if a strike occurs and the firm can't meet that demand (recall point 4 above).
Consequence 6: It is expected that in the long run, NAFTA will increase the demand
for U.S. made products by opening markets abroad. By so doing, U.S. workers may have a
stronger position. Concurrently, U.S. firms will have more competition but also face greater
demand for their products.
What is the overall conclusion from the points raised above? The answer is a standard
economist's response, "it depends.' Whether NAFTA ultimately has a positive or negative
impact on strike behavior depends on Which of the points raised above predominate. A rea-
sonable viewpoint might be to assume that the effects cancel out. If that is the case, then the
trends in place prior to NAFT.s passage will likely continue. This is why the trend analysis
on work stoppages is so relevant, even from a univariate perspective.
VII. Conclusions
The points in section IV, do not, unfortunately, give a clear picture of what the expect-
ed impact should be of a more open economy on aggregate work stoppage behavior in the
U.S. What the points raised do suggest, however, is that NAFTA might not be expected to
induce a new structural change in strike behavior over time. If, in fact, NAFTA produces
both negative and positive consequences for unionized workers, the broad impact of
NAFTA may be that these countervailing effects wash out. If this is the case, there is no rea-
son to believe that NAFTA will affect the time trend of strike behavior in the U.S. one way
or the other from where it was prior to NAFTA's passage. Thus, one might well expect the
current downward trends in aggregate work stoppage behavior to continue.
The results presented in this paper suggest that the breaking trend stationarity model
fits the time series data on work stoppage and workers involved variables better than the
nonstationary model; these variables appear to exhibit business cycle properties in the sense
that there is a mean-reversion over the business cycle around the breaking linear trend line.
Moreover, empirical research on strike behavior that uses techniques based on integrated
classification of time series is called into question. A caveat to the above result is that the
unit root tests performed above are valid asymptotically and may not have sufficient power
in the case of sample size considered here, to settle the issue without any doubt.
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Technical Appendix
This appendix provides a primer of the time series methodology used in this paper.
Time series models are based on the idea that a sample of observations (such as work stop-
pages) has been generated by a stochastic (i.e., random) process, with a structure that can be
characterized and described. The model does not describe a causal relationship, rather it
describes the randomness embodied in the series (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). It is cru-
cially important to know whether or not the series is stationary, i.e., we need to know if the
underlying stochastic process that generated the series is invariant with respect to time. If
the series is nonstationary, i.e., the stochastic process changes over time, it will be difficult to
represent the time series over past and future intervals of time by a simple algebraic modeL
Although it is difficult to model a nonstationary process, it can be shown that nonstationary
processes can often be transformed into stationary processes.
Although it is difficult to completely describe the stochastic process underlying a time
series, the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function provide useful insights into
the process and to test whether or not the series is stationary. However, the more formal
method of testing for nonstationarity is normally referred to as a "unit root" test. Most
studies use the unit root tests introduced by Dickey and Fuller (1979) which we describe in
the paper. The null hypothesis of a unit root (i.e., the series is nonstationary) against the
alternative hypothesis that the series is stationary. Because of some concerns about the
power of this test, some researchers have devised tests (which we also use in this paper) that
set up the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of non stationarity.
However, either of these tests may be biased if there has been a structural change, such as
the initiation of the right to collectively bargain. In other words, the tests may indicate that
the series is not stationary when in fact it is stationary, but with a one time shift in the
series.
Before explaining the time series techniques a few basic statistical concepts must be
explained: stationarity, autocorrelation, and differencing. A time series is said to be station-
ary if the underlying stochastic process that generated the series is invariant with respect to
time which implies that the mean, variance and covariance do not change over time. Since it
is difficult to model nonstationary time series, it is fortunate that most economic time series
can be made stationary by differencing the series. The first difference of a series is defined as
Ayt = Yt- Yt-1-
Since it is important to determine if a series is stationary and how many times and in
what manner a series must be differenced, a correlogram is usually constructed. The correl-
ogram shows the values of the autocorrelation function for various lag lengths.
Autocorrelation is the measure of how much correlation there exists (and how much inter-
dependency) between neighboring data points in the time series yt. The autocorrelation
coefficient varies between -1 and +1. The closer the coefficient is to -1 or +1, the stronger is
the relationship. If the autocorrelation function drops off quickly as the lag-length increases,
the series is stationary. If it does not drop off, it is non stationary.
The technique assumes that there are three types of models that can fit the time series
data pattern: 1) autoregressive (AR), 2) moving average (MA), and 3) a combination of
both known as autoregressive-moving average (ARMA). The models are often referred to as
ARIMA (p,d,q) models. The "I" stands for "integrated" which refers to the number of times
the series needs to be differenced to make it stationary, and thus how many times it needed
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to be "integrated" (the opposite of differenced) to obtain the original series. The appropri-
ate model is determined by analyzing autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions.
(The partial autocorrelation function measures the relationship between a variable with
earlier values of that variables after adjusting for the effects of the other time lags.) The
basic idea is to compare these functions to theoretical distributions, which represent differ-
ent models. The theoretical model best matching the actual past observed data pattern is
chosen.
The equation for an AR model of order p is a weighted average of past observation
going back p periods, together with a random disturbance in the current period. We denote
this process as AR(p) and write its equation as:
Yt 4' CYt-I + 02Yt-2 + ""-+ OpYt-p + a + Ct
where yt is the dependent variable and the lag values of yt are the independent variables, d is
a constant, and Et is a random error term. The values of the Os and p must be determined.
The equation for an MA model is a weighted average of past disturbance terms going
back q periods. We denote this as MA(q) and write its equation as:
At = 9. + F- - VIlt_1 - V2 2 -.- Vq ..t-q
Many stationary random processes cannot be modeled as purely AR(p) or MA(q) but
can be modeled as a combination of both. We denote this process as ARMA(p,q) and write
it as:
Yt = OlYt-I + 012Yt-2 + --- + OpYt-p + 8 + Et - VIA-I - V2 t-2 -'" Vqt-q
The choice of the appropriate model is accomplished in three steps: 1) Make the data sta-
tionary. 2) Examine the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions to determine
the appropriate AR(p), MA(q), or ARMA(p,q) model. There are some basic rules to use as
guidelines for finding the best model. If the autocorrelations drop off exponentially to zero
and the partial autocorrelations are close to zero after p periods, an AR(p) model is indicat-
ed. If the partial autocorrelations decline exponentially to zero and the autocorrelation is
nearly zero after q periods, a MA(q) model is indicated. If both the partial autocorrelation
and autocorrelations functions decline exponentially, then some type of ARMA(p,q) is indi-
cated. 3) Estimate the parameters. Then examine the residuals (errors) using autocorrela-
tion analysis to determine if they behave randomly. The Box and Pierce Q statistic can be
used for this test.
Once these steps have been completed, the researcher should have a much clearer
understanding of the behavior to the variable. In other words, the researcher should be able
to determine if the variable has been trending up or down or has no apparent pattern. For
additional details on times series modelling, consult any standard text on time series analy-
sis. An excellent basic treatment is given in Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991).
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Table 1
U.S. Trade with Canada and Mexico (1987 U.S. $)
U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Total U.SJ U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Total U.S.I





































Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Table 2
U.S. Merchandise Exports and Imports by Area, 1984-93 (Billions of Dollars)
1994 first 3
quarters at
Item 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 annual ratei
Exports 219.9 215.9 223.3 250.2 320.2 362.1 389.3 416.9 440.1 456.9 491.4
Industrial Countries 141.0 140-5 150.3 165.6 207.3 234.2 253.8 261.3 264.9 270.7 289.0
Canada 53.0 55.4 56.5 62.0 74.3 81.1 83.5 85.9 91.1 101.2 112.0
Japan 23.2 22.1 26.4 27.6 37.2 43.9 47.8 47.2 46.9 46.7 51.7
Western Europe2 56.9 56.0 56.0 68.6 86.4 98.4 111.4 116.8 114.5 111.3 112.4
Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa 7.8 7.0 7.1 7.4 9.4 10.9 11.2 11.4 12.4 115 12.9







74.6 71.9 71.0 82.3 109.1 122.2 130.6 150.4 169.5 179.8
13.8 11.4 10.4 10.7 13.8 13.3 13.4 18.5 20.7 18.7
60.8 60.5 60.6 71.6 95.3 108.9 117.2 131.9 148.8 161.1
4.3 3.2 2.1 2.3 3.8 5.5 4.3 4.8 5.6 6.2
and unallocated .0 .2 - - .1 2 .6 .4 .1 .2
Imports 332.4 338.1 368.4 409.8 4472 477.2 498.3 490.7 536.3 589.4
Industrial countries 205.5 219.0 245.4 259.7 283.2 292.5 299.9 294.2 316.2 347.8
Canada 67.6 70.2 69.7 73.6 84.6 89.9 93.1 93.0 100.9 113.3
Japan 60.2 65.7 80.8 84.6 89.8 93.5 90.4 92.3 97.4 107.2
Western Europe2  72.1 77.5 89.0 96.1 102.6 102.4 109.2 191.9 111.3 120.9
Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa 5.6 5.6 5.9 5.4 6.2 6.6 7.3 7.0 6.6 6.4






124.7 117.3 121.1 148.2 161.8 182.8 196.1 194.8 218.1 238.1
26.9 22.8 18.9 24.4 23.0 30.7 38.2 33.4 33.7 32.6
97.8 94.5 102.2 123.8 138.8 152.1 157.9 161.4' 184.4 205.4
2.2 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.3 1.8 2.0 3.5
International organizations
and unallocated - - - - - - - -
Balance (excess
of exports) -112.5 122.2 -145.1 -159.6 -127.0 -115.2 -109.0 -73.8 -96.1 -132.6
Industrial countries -64.5 -78.4 -95.1 -94.1 -75.9 -58.3 -46.1 -32.8 -51.3 -77.2
Canada -14.6 -14.8 -13.2 -11.6 -10.3 -8.9 -9.6 -7.1 -9.7 -12.1
Japan -37.0 -43.5 -54.4 -56.9 -52.6 -49.7 -42.6 -45.0 -50.5 -60.5
Western Europe2  -15.2 -21.4 -28.6 -27.5 16.2 4.0 2.2 14.9 3.2 -9.7
Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa 2.2 1.4 1.1 2.0 3.2 4.2 3.9 4.4 5.8 5.2








-50.1 -45.3 -50.1 -65.8 -52.7 -60.6 -65.6 -44.4 -48.6 -58.3
-13.1 -11.4 -8.5 -13.7 -9.2 -17.4 -24.8 -15.0 -13.0 -14.0
-37.0 -33.9 -41.6 -52.1 -43.5 -43.2 -40.7 -29.4 -35.6 -44.3
2.1 1.4 .1 .3 1.6 3.5 2.1 3.0 3.7 2.7
.0 .2 - - .1 .2 .6 .4 .1 .2 .0
I Preliminary; seasonally adjusted.2The former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) induded in Western Europe beginning fourth quarter 1990 and in Eastern Europe prior to
that time. "3 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, consisting of Algeria, Ecuador (through 1992), Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Ernirates, and Venezuela.4
Latin America, other Western Hemisphere, and other countries in Asia and Africa, less members of OPEC.
Note. Data are on an international transactions basis and exclude military.
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Table 3
U.S. Membership in AFL-CIO Affiliated Unions, by Selected Union:
1979-1993
Labor Organization 1979 1989 1993
Total' 13,621 14,000 13,299
Actors and Artists 75 97 93
Automobile, Aerospace and Agriculture (UAW) X) 917 771
Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco 131 103 99
Boiler Makers, Iron Shipbuilders23  129 75 58
Bricklayers 106 84 84
Carpenters 2  626 613 408
Clothing and Textile Workers (ACTWU) 2  308 180 143
Communication Workers (CWA) 485 492 472
Electrical Workers (IBEW) 825 744 710
Electronic, Electrical and Salaried2,4  243 171 143
Operating Engineers 313 330 305
Fire Fighters 150 142 151
Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW)2 1,123 999 997
Garment Workers (ILGWU) 314 153 133
Glass, Molders, Pottery and Plastics 2  50 86 73
Government, American Federation (AFGE) 236 156 149
Graphic Communications2  171 124 95
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 373 278 258
Ironworkers 146 111 91
Laborers 475 406 408
Letter Carriers (NALC) 151 201 210
Longshoreman's Association 63 62 58
Machinists and Aerospace (lAM) 2  688 517 474
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association 23 48 52
Mine Workers X) (X) 75
Office and Professional Employees 83 84 89
Oil, Chemical, Atomic Workers (OCAW) 146 71 86
Painters 160 128 106
Paper Workers International 262 210 188
Plumbing and Pipe Fitting 228 220 220
Postal Workers 245 213 249
Retail, Wholesale Department Store 122 137 80
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, Plastic 158 92 81
Seafarers 84 80 80
Service Employees (SEIU) 2 5  537 762 919
Sheet Metal Workers 120 108 108
Stage Employees, Moving Picture Machine Operators 50 50 51
State, County, Municipal (AFSCME)5 889 1,090 1,167
Steel Workers 964 481 421
Teachers (AFT) 423 544 574
Teamsters6  X) 1,161 1,316
Transit Union 94 96 94
Transport Workers 85 85 78
Transportation Union, United 121 (X) 60
(X) Not applicable.
'Indudes other AFL-CIO affiliated unions, not shown separately.2Figures reflect mergers with one or more unions since 1979. For details see source.
3Includes Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers,4 lncludes Machine and Furniture Workers.
Excludes Hospital and Health Care Employees which merged into both unions on June 1. 1989, (membership of 23,000 in 1985
60,000 in 1987; and 58,000 in 1989).6[ncludes Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers.




Work Stoppages: 1960 to 1993
[Excludes work stoppages involving fewer than 1,000 workers and lasting less than 1 day
information is based on reports of labor disputes appearing in daily newspapers, trade jour-
nals, and other public sources. The parties to the disputes are contacted by telephone, when
necessary, to clarify details of the stoppages]






















































































IBeginning in year indicated.2 Workers counted more than once if involved in more than one stoppage during the year.3 Resulting from all stoppages in effect in a year, including those that began in an earlier year.4Agricultural and government employees are including in the total working time, private household and forestry
and fishery employees are excluded.5Revised since originally published.
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Table 5
Dickey-Fuller Test of a Unit Root, 1947-1993
Confidence
Variable Lag p TIC Interval
Number of work stoppages





Note: Presented are values of j from
k
As, = a + Pt + (p -I)st. 1 + , s .l + ut
The critical values for Ho : p=O for the 10%, 5%, and 2% level are -3.19, -3.52, -4.18, respectively. The asymptotic
confidence intervals for the largest autoregressive root are based on the tables given in Stock (1991).
Table 6
Test of Trend Stationarity, 1947-1993
Variable Critical Value












Number of workers affected
0.146
0.146
Note: * indicates that the null hypothesis of trend stationarity against the alternative of a unit root can be rejected
at the 5% level.
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Table 7
Test of a Unit Root with a Segmented Trend
Variable Break Year Lag a P 8 p HO : p=O
No. of work 1965 3 365.93 -11.6 172.10 0.23 -4.65**
stoppages (4.48) (-4.39) (3.83)
No. of workers 1965 3 1755.6 -59.99 1048.42 0.21 -5.15*
affected (4.95) (-4.98) (4.51)
Note: The results are based on the regression
k
y, = a + 3t + SDU t + pyt.1+ 1: ciAy' + eti=1
The numbers in parentheses are conventional t-values.
The and - indicate a statistical significance at 5% and 10% respectively.
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